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NULLIFYING HISTORY:
MODERN-DAY MISUSE OF THE
RIGHT TO DECIDE THE LAW
David A. Peppert
INTRODUCTION
A battle over competing visions of American democracy, fought
in decades and centuries past, has resurfaced in law reviews,' as well
as inside2 and outside3 courtrooms, in recent decades. On one side
stands our current system of law making and law interpreting, based
on the notion that our nation's laws should emanate from a carefully
structured process, anchored in formal elections by the people and a
formal law-making regime to which the people's elected representa-
tives must adhere. It is a democracy based ultimately on the popular
will, but with a web of procedural controls aimed to ensure that laws
are enacted properly, consistently, with deliberation, and in a manner
which best represents the views of the majority (while not falling be-
low certain constitutional limitations). A crucial aspect of this vision
is that courts, and the juries that serve them, are obliged to follow in
good faith the law as enacted.
t Law Clerk, the Honorable Nathaniel Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
J.D. Yale Law School, 1999; B.A. Yale College, 1993. I would like to thank Professor Abraham
Goldstein for his active and helpful guidance throughout this project, as well as the participants
in the Spring 1999 Criminal Jury Seminar at the Yale Law School for their feedback on an early
draft of this paper. Thanks in particular to R. Craig Green and Laura Aim for their always-
insightful comments and criticisms.
I See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, VE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 667 (1995); see also Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 VA. L REV. 253 (1996); Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say
No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972); Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspec-
tive on a Modem Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389 (1989).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" The Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA), among its other proposed reforms, pro-
poses abolishing jury "oaths" because "the law belongs to the people ... and it is always theirs
to apply or not apply as they see fit." See Needed Jury System Reforms (visited August 26,
1999) http://nowscape.comlfijaLmaxi.html. FIJA often distributes its literature to juries as they
enter courthouses. See id. FIJA has convinced numerous state legislators to introduce bills to
inform jurors of their power to nullify, and undertaken other similar lobbying steps. See Nancy
S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 942, 944 nn. 285-89 (1999).
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On the other side of the battle stands a starkly different vision of
democracy. Voiced by scholars as well as grass roots groups, this vi-
sion challenges the relatively rigid law-making process described
above. The people, it argues, should have more direct control over the
making of the laws than the current system allows. More specifically,
juries have a far more crucial role to play in our democracy. Rather
than simply following the law as passed by the legislature in its repre-
sentative capacity, juries provide a second institution through which
the people can and should exercise law-making and law-rejecting
powers. Indeed, when they deem it appropriate, jurors have a right to
enact their communal or personal norms in direct contravention of
formally enacted laws. Voters left disenfranchised by laws passed
without their support can in effect strike down those same laws in
their capacity as jurors. This argument is commonly termed nullifica-
tion.
These visions of democracy directly clash on one plane in par-
ticular-the question of whether we should maintain our current sys-
tem's acceptance of juries' power to nullify law, or accept the argu-
ment that juries possess the right to nullify laws. The former, the
"power" to nullify, results naturally from the combination of (1) our
system of formal lawmaking; (2) our belief in judicial and juror inde-
pendence and autonomy; and (3) our principles against double jeop-
ardy. These factors together allow a jury to acquit a defendant with
impunity for whatever reason it desires (including disagreement with
the underlying law), and of course, that defendant cannot be retried
under the relevant law. Importantly, this power to nullify emanates
not at all from a notion that jurors should play a role in law making.
In that realm, the people's role remains confined to voting. In con-
trast, the right to nullify, although appearing quite similar to the
power to do so, emerges from the radically different vision of democ-
racy described above. Accepting nullification as a right would intro-
duce not only a vastly different role for juries within the operation of
our democratic system, but would bring a host of smaller changes at
trials themselves, such as requiring judges to inform juries of their
right to nullify,4 not allowing judges to remove "nullifying" jurors
from juries,5 and eliminating many of the safeguards that maximize
4 See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting an argu-
ment that a judge should instruct a jury on the history of nullification).




jurors' ability to apply the law they are given to the facts in question
without distraction.
Even this narrower debate of whether juries have the right or
only the power to nullify takes place on many fronts.7 This Article
will join the foray on only one, but a crucial one. In recent decades,
scholars who assert that juries have the right to nullify have pointed to
American centuries past as evidence that such a right historically ex-
isted. In particular, these scholars call on the early American legal
doctrine that juries possessed the "right to decide the law" as key
precedent buttressing their modem-day claim of a nullification right.
This ancient jury right, they assert, was no different than the right to
nullify they wish for jurors to possess today. Indeed, some scholars
claim it was more sweeping. They thus call on us to reclaim that tra-
dition through nullification.
This Article will argue that the pro-nullification appeal to history
is misconceived because it fails to analyze precisely what our Ameri-
can ancestors intended when they attributed to juries the "right to de-
cide the law." Close analysis reveals that proponents of the jury's
right to decide the law, joined by decisions granting juries that right,
envisioned something considerably more constrained than today's
"right to nullify." Indeed, this Article will show that the former right
clearly did not warrant jurors to find a law or prosecution void, or to
refuse to apply a law, for running counter to their personal notions of
justice-which are precisely the prerogatives that today's nullification
scholars want jurors to possess. The former "right," in other words,
did not emerge from a notion that juries occupy a quasi-legislative tier
in our democratic system, as today's pro-nullification scholars be-
lieve. These scholars' equation of the right to nullify and the right to
decide the law is therefore fatally flawed.
Part I of this Article will introduce and summarize the pro-
nullification historical account. This tale begins with the dawning of
jury autonomy in England and the increasing authority of the jury in
American colonial cases, and culminates with the reign of the "right
to decide the law" in the first century after the Founding. Today's
6 See generally Needed Jury-System Reforms, supra note 3 (proposing the abolishment
of juror oaths and greatly limiting jury instructions).
7 For example, a number of scholars have argued against a right to nullify because the
jury is not a democratically legitimate body. See, e.g., Richard St. John, Note, License to Nul-
lify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies ofAuthorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE
LJ. 2563, 2565 (1997) ("As a matter of democratic legitimacy, as well as constitutional law, the
jury's power to nullify becomes more, not less, problematic when it is elevated to the status of
putative right."). For a related and thoughtful exploration of the jury's role in a democratic
system, and the extent to which a jury itself is democratic, see Richard A. Primus, When De-
mocracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries,
18 CARDozo L REv. 1417 (1997).
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pro-nullification scholars ask that we "return" to the days when jurors
had the right to nullify at will.
Part II critiques this modem interpretation. It looks closely at the
origins of the "right to decide the law," as well as the many sources
that elaborated on the right as it existed in its heyday, to explore the
meaning behind that right. In particular, it will highlight the central
limitations on the right, which were always in place and which render
the modem nullification scholar's analogy to that right flawed. Ironi-
cally, the very cases on which the pro-nullification account relies in
describing a past right to nullify highlight the argument's errors. Part
H summarizes the ways in which the two rights differed.
Part IV concludes the Article, arguing that nullification scholars
will have to look elsewhere to support their case for the jury's right to
nullify. At the very least, history is not on their side.
I. THE PRO-NULLIFICATION HISTORICAL ACCOUNT: FROM THE
GLORY OF BUSHELL'S CASE TO THE TRAGEDY OF SPARF & HANSEN
In recent decades, pro-nullification scholars have called upon the
past to argue for the jury's right to nullify.8 They allege that a jury
right to nullify has historically existed, and that, beginning with the
Supreme Court case Sparf & Hansen v. United States,9 an "anomaly"
emerged where courts have rescinded that "right" ever since. After
presenting these scholars' definition of nullification, this Part will
summarize their historical account in two steps. First, it will present
the broader historical account of jury nullification, utilizing Paul
Butler's recent effort to extol the virtues of nullification as represen-
tative of the story espoused by pro-nullification scholars.' 0 The Part
will then examine in more detail the latter phase of that account:
when the American jury possessed the right to decide law as well as
fact.
A. Defining Nullification: Deciding Against the Law for Non-Legal
Reasons
Although the term "nullification" is often used imprecisely,"
those who call for a right to nullify espouse the same central princi-
8 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 1 (presenting an historical argument for the existence
of a right to nullify); Butler, supra note 1 (same); Scheflin, supra note 1 (same).
9 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
10 Butler, supra note 1 (suggesting that African-American jurors should engage in jury
nullification in certain cases).
" See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614 (stating that "the term 'nullification' can cover a number
of distinct, though related, phenomena"); see also Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Mer-
ciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 167 (1991)
(explaining that the "[jiury nullification debate ... has been hampered by semantics").
[Vol. 50:599
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ple-that juries can reject the formal law as they understand it if ap-
plying that law would offend their own notions of justice or morality.
As described above, nullification therefore grants the jury a quasi-
legislative function, allowing it to augment and check the results of
our formal law-making procedures. A brief look at several scholars'
views highlights this essential principle of the nullification account.
Paul Butler defines nullification in the following way: when a
jury acquits a defendant whom it believes to be guilty of the crime
charged because the jury objects to the criminal statute that the defen-
dant violated or to the law's application to that defendant. 12 Butler
makes clear that when he calls on African-American jurors to nullify,
he is calling on them to "be guided by their view of what is 'just.', 1 3
Professors Scheflin and Van Dyke define nullification similarly:
when jurors, on the basis of conscience and mercy, refuse'to convict a
defendant who is technically guilty under the enacted law. 14 Profes-
sors Horowitz and Willging describe nullification as the power to ac-
quit those who are legally guilty but morally upright. In other words,
nullification is the right to deliver a verdict counter to both the law
and evidence.15 Finally, Professor Green characterizes nullification as
a three-tiered hierarchy, with all three tiers including an element of
defying the law based on moral or legal reasons. 16 In short, from all
these perspectives, two key facets anchor an act of nullification: (1) it
involves a decision counter to the formally enacted law;17 and (2) it is
12 See Butler, supra note 1, at 700.
" Id. at 715.
14 See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
LAW AND CoNTEiP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 56. The authors go on to say that a nullifi-
cation instruction would involve telling jurors to consider if "it would be fair and just to apply
... the criminal law [against] an accused person, and that they should refuse to convict if a
guilty verdict would be inconsistent with community standards of justice and fair play." Idl at
52.
IS See Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The
Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAw. & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 165-66 (1991).
16 Strong nullification occurs when the jury recognizes that a defendant's act is proscribed
by the law but acquits because it does not believe the act should be proscribed. Intermediate
nullification occurs when, although the act proved is properly classified as criminal, it is within
a class of acts that do not deserve the punishment prescribed for them. Weak nullification occurs
when, although the act proved is criminal and falls in a class of acts that may well deserve pun-
ishment, such punishment is inappropriate in the case at hand. See generally THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICr ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE (1985).
17 Professors Scheflin and Van Dyke try to cast their mode of nullification as not counter
to law, but as "an integral part of the law itself' because it serves the "unique and vital function
of smoothing the friction between law and justice, and between the people and their laws."
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 11, at 168; see also Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification
Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997) (arguing that nullification often occurs
"within" the rule of law). This does not change the central point that the courts are granting
juries a quasi-legislative role-acting as representatives "smoothing" and molding the law based
on their own notions ofjustice. Without addressing that broader intra-legal theory of nullifica-
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one based on an extra-legal justification (meaning a justification that
arises from the jury's own sense of justice and morality, rather than
one that adheres to the principles emerging from the formal law or
traditional legal reasoning stemming from that law).18 As described in
the Introduction, these two factors are crucial to the pro-nullification
scholar's broader view that juries have a right to impose their own
communal or personal norms in place of law resulting from our for-
mal law-making apparatus.
B. Butler: The Broader History of Nullification
In an historical account representative of the broader nullifica-
tion literature, Professor Butler argues that the "prerogative of juries
to nullify has been part of English and American law for centuries."
19
First in Butler's line of cases establishing this "prerogative" is
Bushell's Case.20 In that trial, a judge fined and jailed jurors for de-
fying his instruction and finding William Penn and William Mead not
guilty of unlawful assembly. When one juror, Bushell, refused to pay
the fine, the case proceeded to the Court of Common Pleas. There,
Chief Justice Vaughan held that juries could not be so punished.2'
According to Butler, the decision "'changed the course of jury his-
tory."' 22 The Bushell's Case jurors "have come to be seen as repre-
senting the best ideals of democracy because they 'rebuffed the tyr-
anny of the judiciary and vindicated their own true historical and
moral purpose.' ''23 In sum, Bushell's Case "established the right of
juries under English common law to nullify on the basis of an objec-
tion to the law the defendant had violated. 24
The next step in the standard historical account of nullification is
the adoption of the right by colonial America. The trial of John Peter
tion, this Article's characterization that an act of nullification is a decision against the law sim-
ply means that it is a decision against the formal law in question in a particular case.18 Those who lobby for jury nullification in legislatures have utilized the same basic con-
ception as the scholars in drafting their proposed instructions. See, e.g., S. 4157, 218th Leg, 1st
reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995) (cited in Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and
Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE. L.J. 2563 (1997)). The
article calls on judges to instruct juries that they have "the final authority to decide whether or
not to apply the law to the facts... that it is appropriate to bring into its deliberations the feel-
ings of the community and its own feelings based on conscience, and that nothing would bar the
jury from acquitting the defendant if it feels that the law, as applied to the facts, would produce
an inequitable or unjust result[.]" Id. at 2576 & n.81. Other proposals make more general ap-
peals to juries to call upon their "conscience" in rendering their verdicts. See id. at 2574-76.
19 Butler, supra note 1, at 701.
20 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 999 (London 1810).
21 See id.
2 Butler, supra note 1, at 702 (quoting ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 73-75).
23 Id. (quoting GREEN, supra note 16, at 225-26).
24 Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 50:599
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Zenger,25 who was accused of seditious libel for criticizing New
York's governor, emerges as the seminal case importing the nullifi-
cation right into early American law. Acceding to a lawyer's urging
to ignore the judge's instructions and instead to follow their own
"consciences and understandings," the Zenger jury acquitted the de-
fendant.26 Hence, "another case entered the canon as a shining exam-
ple of the benefits of the jury system [and] the notion that juries
should decide 'justice,' as opposed to simply applying the law to the
facts, became relatively settled in American jurisprudence."27 After
Zenger and through the mid-nineteenth century, Butler portrays a
landscape where nullification is an accepted doctrine in American
law. He points in particular to early political trials, to "nullification"
acquittals for white defendants who had illegally helped free black
slaves,28 and to cases where juries were told they had a "right to judge
the law."
29
According to Butler, beginning in the mid-1800s, "courts began
to criticize the idea of jurors deciding justice."30 A host of court deci-
sions rejecting the right of "nullification" culminated in Sparf & Han-
sen v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that jurors have
the "power" but not the "right" to nullify. This diminished conception
of the jury's role created an "anomaly" which "has been a feature of
American criminal law ever since."
32
Butler's basic outline is not new. Indeed, it repeats the general
historical account numerous scholars have put forth in recent decades
to show a right to nullify.33 The framework, in its simplest shape, is as
follows: Bushell's Case established the "right" to nullify,34 colonial
and American cases imported that "nullification" right by granting the
2 The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 675 (London 1735).
26 See Butler, supra note 1, at 702.
2 Id. at 702-03.
28 See id. at 703 (recounting white juror's nullification of the Fugitive Slave Act).
29 Id. (quoting United States v. Morris, 26 F. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851)).
o Id. at 703.
" 156U.S. 51, 162 (1895).
32 Butler, supra note 1, at 704.
3 See, e.g., Scheflin, supra note 1, at 169-81 (recounting the history ofjury nullification).
3 See David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct the
Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 94 (1995) (stating that Bushell's Case
established the jury's "right to give a verdict according to its convictions"); Scheffin, supra note
1, at 168 (stating that the Bushell's Case jurors' courage "has been institutionalized in our legal
system under the doctrine of jury nullification"); John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and
O.J.: Jury Nullification-Justice of the "Wacko-Fringe's" Attempt to Further its Anti-
Government Agenda, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1996) (stating that "[miany commentators
use Bushell to advance the argument that jury nullification is a historic right"); Robert J. Stolt,
Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEw ENG. L. REV., Fall 1971, at 105, 107
(describing that Bushell's Case established the "right and the power of a jury to decide accord-
ing to their collective conscience").
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jury the "right" to "decide the law,' 35 and Sparf rescinded the right
when it denied jurors the "right" to "decide the law., 36 Although other
aspects of nullification history are also flawed,37 this Article will fo-
cus more narrowly on the latter portion of this history, which mis-
characterizes the American doctrine granting the jury the "right to
decide the law." The next section will summarize the nullification
scholars' analysis of this doctrine in more detail.
C. The Right To Decide the Law as The Right To Nullify
Nullification scholars uniformly point to the American jury's
past "right to decide the law" to support their proposed right to nul-
lify. Symbolized by Zenger, they argue, the right to decide the law
emerged in early colonial times and continued through the first cen-
tury of the founding of the United States. Their evidence includes
colonial cases, 8 statements by the Founders,39 Supreme Court cases4°
35 See Brody, supra note 34, at 95 (describing that the Framers "clung to the concept of
jury nullification"); Scheflin, supra note 1, at 173-75 (describing how jury nullification "had
become an integral part of the American judicial system" because the jury's right to decide the
law was widely accepted); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 14, at 57 (describing how jury
nullification principles spread to the American colonies and were symbolized by the Zenger
trial); Stolt, supra note 34, at 107 (describing that the "English common law conviction of jury
nullification came to America with the early colonists," as symbolized by Zenger).
36 See Scheflin, supra note 1, at 179-81 (stating that Sparfculminated in favor of a limited
role for the jury); Stolt, supra note 34, at 110 (describing Sparfs rejection of "the right of jury
nullification").
37 For instance, the account misconstrues Bushell's Case. Sparfitself correctly dismissed
the argument that Bushell's Case established the "right" to nullify. "[Tihe fundamental proposi-
tion decided was that in view of the different functions of court and jury, and because a general
verdict, of necessity, resolves 'both law and fact complicately,' . . . it could never be proved,
where the case went to the jury upon both law and facts, that the jurors did not proceed upon
their view of the evidence." Sparf, 156 U.S. at 90-91. Far from establishing the right to decide
against the law, therefore, the Bushell's opinion established the jury's power to decide against
the law in rendering general verdicts. For more detailed discussions of this analysis, see Com-
monwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 211 (1855) (stating that Judge Vaughn's opinion
was limited to the proposition that "the jury cannot be required implicitly to give a verdict by
the dictates and authority of the judge"); see also GREEN, supra note 16, at 249 ("If Vaughn had
any thought about law-finding or the jury's right to apply law mercifully, he kept them to him-
self."); Leipold, supra note 1, at 297 (stating that Vaughan's opinion "did not conclude that
juries.., had the right to determine what the law should be, [but] only decided that it was im-
proper to punish the jurors"); Scott, supra note 1, at 394-408 (concluding that "[t]he opinion in
Bushel not only fails to support the nullification position, it actually undercuts it"); Gary J.
Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 494
(1976) (stating that Bushell's Case merely vindicated the jury's role "to finding the facts and
applying the received law 'complicatedly' to those facts"). For a critique of the decision itself as
"dishonest nonsense," see John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI.
L. REv. 263,298-99 & n.105 (1978).
38 See Scheflin, supra note 1, at 173-74 (discussing the role of the jury in criminal trials
during the colonial era).
39 See JOHN ADAMS DIARY, in 2 THE LIFE AND WoRKs OF JOHN ADA~is 253-55 (Charles
Francis Adams ed. 1850) (describing the jury's right to exercise judgment).
40 See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (describing the right of the
jury to determine the law) (cited in Scheflin, supra note 1, at 176).
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and lower court holdings penned by Supreme Court Justices,41 federal
statutes, 42 and state constitutions and trials.43 As stated above, the era
in which this jury "right" reigned provides a crucial bridge in the nul-
lification account, extending the interpretation of Bushell's Case geo-
graphically into the American domain and temporally to the dawn of
the 20th century. If a reader accepts this historical backdrop, Butler's
claim that today's rejection of the right to nullify is an "anomaly"
rings true.
Crucially, this account assumes that the "right to decide the law"
is functionally equivalent to the "right to nullify." This assumption
would hold in either of two situations: (1) if the two phases are syn-
onymous; or (2) if the right to decide the law comprised a broader
power that necessarily would have encompassed the modem day right
to nullify. Most scholars assume the former, conflating the two terms
without articulation and discussing them interchangeably. 4 Others
adopt the latter, claiming that the right to decide the law inherently
included the narrower right to nullify. Professor Abramson has ar-
ticulated this relationship between the two rights more directly than
any other scholar:
Jurors' right to decide questions of law gives them consid-
erably greater authority than jury nullification itself requires.
That right to nullify is narrow, permitting jurors only the
right not to apply the law. The crucial significance of this re-
striction is that juries can nullify to acquit, never to convict.
By contrast, the right to decide questions of law entitles ju-
rors to apply their own interpretation of the law to either the
detriment or the benefit of a defendant.45
41 See, e.g., Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924 (Pa. Cir. Ct. 1800) (charging juries that they were
to judge both law and facts) (cited in Scheflin, supra note 1, at 176).
42 See Act of July 14, 1798 (Alien and Sedition Act), ch. 74, § 3, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (grant-
ing the jury the right to determine the law) (cited in Scheflin, supra note 1, at 176).
43 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. i § 1, 11; MD. CONsr. (Dec. of Rights) art. XXIIL
4 See Brody, supra note 34, at 99-104; Butler, supra note 1, at 702-04; Lawrence W.
Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1997);
Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and
Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440 (1988); Horowitz &
Willging, supra note 15, at 166; William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases,
10 VA. J. INT'LL. 71, 73-76 (1969); Reed, supra note 34, at 1133-36; Kate Stith-Cabranes, The
Criminal Jury in Our Time, 3 VA. J. SOC. Po.'Y & L. 133, 136 (1995); Stolt, supra note 34, at
108-10.
4s ABRAMiSON, supra note 1, at 67-68 (emphasis added).
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Thus, he claims, the emergence of the American jury's "law-finding
right" necessarily incorporated the right to nullify,46 and the demise of
the right in the 19th century negated the right to nullify. Abramson
explains that although "[l]ogically speaking, it [was] possible to de-
fend jury nullification while rejecting the notion that juries have any
general right to decide questions of law ... historically, jury nullifi-
cation was debated as one example of the broader claim that jurors
decided questions of law."47 Similarly, Professor Scheflin explains
that "the right of the jury to decide questions of law of necessity con-
tains the lesser integral right to nullify .... [IMt is quite possible to
disapprove of the broader right without also disapproving of the nulli-
fication right. 4 8 He is thus comfortable treating the two rights as es-
sentially the same, as he does when he writes: "[-]n the period imme-
diately before the [American] Revolution, jury nullification in the
broad sense had become an intregral part of the American judicial
system. The principle that juries could evaluate and decide questions
of both fact and law was accepted by leading jurists of the period.' 49
Similarly, Scheflin confidently asserts that 19th century cases re-
scinding the jury's law-finding right simultaneously signaled the
"demise of the nullification right."50 With this argument firmly in
place, the nullification historical account appears to lead seamlessly
and logically into its current call to return to that past. By showing its
central assumption to be faulty, the remainder of this Article will cut
off the nullification historical account at its roots.
II. THE NARROW CONTOURS OF THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THE LAW
Undoubtedly, the early American experience included the jury's
right to decide the law.51 As nullification scholars point out, evidence
46 See id. at 75-77. As do other nullification scholars, Abramson therefore points to 17th
and 18th century cases establishing juries' right to decide the law and concludes that they
granted the right to nullify. See id. at 68-75.
47 Id. at 68.
48 Scheflin, supra note 1, at 169 n.2. Scheflin exerts considerable effort to show that his
proposed right to nullify is a narrow one. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 11, at 167 (sug-
gesting that nullification "complete[s]" the law by permitting the jury to exercise "that one last
touch of mercy").
49 Scheflin, supra note 1, at 174 (emphasis added); see also id at 224 (describing Andrew
Hamilton's plea to the Zenger jurors to determine the law for themselves as explaining that
"they had the historic and time-honored duty to nullify").
o Id. at 177; see also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 14, at 57 (describing the Zenger
trial as "[tihe most famous colonial example of jury nullification"); id. at 57-58 (describing
founders' and justices' description of the jury's right to decide the law as acceptance of the
principle of nullification).
51 See, e.g., R.J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42
YALE L.J. 194, 202 (1932) ("In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time there-
after, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have been almost universally ac-
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abounds of that right: statements by the Founders, cases and judicial
statements at all levels, tracts, state constitutions, statutes, and other
sources. 52 Yet the nullification scholars, satisfied in merely high-
lighting evidence of that right, have largely failed to take the crucial
step: determining what functions and duties that right entailed.53 In-
deed, accompanying almost every indication of the existence of the
right to decide the law are clues about its definition and scope. In
overlooking these clues, nullification scholars have fundamentally
misconstrued the careful and precise connotation of the term "right to
decide the law." From its intellectual birth in pre-Bushell's England
through its use in the colonies and the United States' first century, the
right always encompassed a limited prerogative. The best evidence of
its limits lies within the very cases on which the pro-nullification
scholars rely.
By carefully retracing this historical evidence, the remainder of
this Article will expose that the crucial assumption delineated above
is flawed. Specifically, it will show that the right to decide the law
was neither equivalent to today's proposed right to nullify, nor did it
encompass the right to nullify. To the contrary, the right to decide the
law swept narrowly, placing a clear duty on juries to follow the law as
they saw it, rather than reject the law as pro-nullification scholars
would have them do.54 Other strict limitations also applied, limita-
tions over which the nullification right of today would run roughshod.
The only similarities between the two are ultimately superficial ones.
Thus, blindly to equate the two "rights" simply misreads American
law of the past. Likewise, to assume that the extinct "right to decide
the law" shows that America once accepted the radically different
notion of a nullification-based democracy also misreads the past. As
the Article will make clear, the right to decide the law can at most be
seen as a challenge to judges' roles as interpreters of the law, and not
to legislators' roles as the makers of law.
corded the jury ..... ); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 582 (1939) (reviewing the historical role ofjuries in criminal proceedings).
52 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for scholarly asser-
tions of the existence of the right to nullify).
53 This failure is particularly egregious because they have failed even to address the ar-
guments of judges and scholars who have uncovered some key pieces of evidence that undercut
their historical claims.
" In presenting this argument, this Article fills out in detail an argument begun by Sim-
son, which nullification scholars appear to have overlooked since. See Simson, supra note 37, at
505-07. It also builds upon observations made by Professor Amar. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 98, 342 n.64 (1998) (critiquing Scheflin's work
for "unhelpfully conflatfing]" nullification and the right to decide the law).
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A. The Right to Decide the Law
1. English Origins: The Leveller and Quaker Movements
In his Verdict According to Conscience,55 Professor Green de-
scribes the English birth of the "ideology of jury law-finding." The
law-finding theory emerged as the traditionally broad powers of the
self-informing jury56 of the middle ages waned under a combination
of pressures: The emergence of more nuanced substantive law, the
rise of government prosecutors (superseding what had largely been
the jury's inquisitorial role), the growing power of the bench, the
greater legitimacy of a public rather than private criminal law system
(decreasing the need for the jury's legitimizing role), and others.57
These new limitations on the jury's powers and the greater transpar-
ency provided by growing substantive law and a more powerful
bench compelled a question that had never arisen previously: could a
jury return a verdict in the face of substantive law and, specifically, in
the teeth of a judge's instruction on how to interpret that law? In re-
sponse to this question, "[tihe right of the jury to [itself decide the
law] had now to be invented and given a place in political and con-
stitutional theory., 58 Green describes two groups that "invented" this
right in the 17th century. Their articulation of the law-finding right
gives the first indication of the duties and obligations that the right
instilled on the jury. Although never adopted in English law, these
first notions of jury law-finding would re-emerge across the Atlantic.
The first direct assertion of juries' right to decide the law came
from John Lilburne and the Levellers, a radical group that clashed
with Cromwell's regime in the mid-17th century. The full details of
the Levellers' struggle are beyond the scope of this Article,59 how-
ever, a crucial part of the Levellers' program for radical reform was
the jury's right to decide the law. The discussion first emerged with
Lilburne's publishing of the tract Just Man s Justification in 1646 and
carried on at a high pitch until 1653, when Lilburne was tried and ac-
quitted for a second time for his acts against the Crown.60 After a
55 GREEN, supra note 16.
56 Green explains that the jury's broad medieval power had not included the right to de-
cide the law. See id. at 150. "[Tlhe medieval jury's de facto power to find law had always been
founded on the realities of the process," which included little substantive law and a weak bench.
Id. 57 See id. at 1-152.
58 Id. at 150.
59 For a detailed account of the Levellers' struggle for the jury's iight to decide the law,




modest start,61 Lilburne first voiced his belief that juries were' "judges
of law" at his trial in 1649.62 Although his argument was rejected by
the trial judge, Lilburne's theory gained momentum when the jury
acquitted him.6 3 Tracts following that trial bolstered the argument
further, taking Lilburne's discussion in a more radical direction.64 Fi-
nally, Lilburne's trial in 1653 and the literature he prepared for that
trial fine-tuned the Leveller theory of jury law-finding.6 5
What did Lilburne mean by jury law-finding? Although the Lev-
ellers' own conceptions evolved in those seven years, several impor-
tant themes emerged which would ultimately resurface in American
legal thought. Most important, when Lilburne stated that juries had
the right to "judge" the law at his 1649 trial, he indeed used the word
judge purposefully-juries were to sit as judges in assessing the law
and were to declare the statute "null and void under the true law of
England. 66 He elaborated on his meaning in his writing and state-
ments to the jury in his 1653 trial. There, Lilburne asked the jury to
undertake several acts of legal interpretation: to assess the legal status
of the 1651 statute which he allegedly violated,67 to contrast that stat-
ute with substantive English common law, which had never provided
a criminal sanction for the acts banned by the statute,68 and to con-
sider the "due process" implications of implying a criminal sanction
that was "never before known." 69 In short, the jury was to acquit him
because he was "not charged with anything that in the true law of
England is a felonious crime."70 He thus asked the jury to make a
purely legal evaluation, insisting that they "examine the charges
against the defendant and to reject them if it found that the facts cited
did not amount to a crime under English law.",
71
61 Initially, the Levellers concluded that the law "was for the ... judges to pronounce,"
with the only check being their possible removal for finding the law "ineptly or wrongfully."
Id. at 165-66. See also id. at 169 (describing that Lilburne, during his imprisonment, "never
abandoned the conventional law-fact distinction").
62 Id. at 173.
63 See id. at 174-76.
64 See id. at 177-82 (representing the Leveller movement at its most radical and calling for
the jury's right to decide the law as part of a plea to create a decentralized legal system based on
scriptures and local community mores).
65 See id. at 192-99.
'6 Id. at 195.
67 Among other faults, the statute had been passed by a rump parliament. See id. at 192.
Lilburne asked the jury to consider whether the enacting body was a "true parliament." Id. at
195.
6 See id. at 193.
69 See id. at 196.
70 Id. at 197.
71 Id. at 198. Leveller confidence that the jury was capable of undertaking this task of
legal reasoning and assessment came from their view of the law as "not inherently complex,"
and primarily as a "matter of right and wrong" that "presumed judgment by peers in accordance
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Although the Leveller movement declined rapidly in the 1650s,
its notions of the jury's right to decide the law continued on through a
new radical movement, the Quakers. While Bushell's Case marked
the pinnacle of the Quaker trials, the Quaker law-finding ideology
developed over numerous prosecutions in the 1660s brought under the
1662 Quaker Act as well as the 1664 Conventicles Act.72 During that
time, arguments in courts and tracts echoed the Levellers' theory that
jurors should acquit defendants by judging the law. Importantly, how-
ever, the nature of their plea showed another important, if narrower,
conception of what "finding the law" meant.
Rather than calling for jurors to negate the law as invalidly en-
acted, as the Levellers had, the Quakers argued that jurors' duty to
interpret statutes allowed them to acquit defendants in contravention
of judicial instructions on the law. First, they insisted that the state's
policy of prosecuting Quakers under the acts violated the statutes'
original purpose, which had been to "punish those who only pre-
tended to take part in religious exercise [in order] to further their se-
ditious ends"7 3 and not to punish other groups engaged in legitimate
religious exercise. The Quaker argument also faulted the bench's in-
terpretation of the law, focusing specifically on the allocation of the
burden of proof in determining the nature of the allegedly illegal
meetings.74 In short, the Quakers called on juries to reject judges'
"view of the statute-[and] to find law insofar as that involved finding
the true meaning of the statute."75 Only the most radical Quaker posi-
tion echoed the Leveller argument, asking juries to go beyond a con-
sideration of the intent behind the statute to assess if the prosecution
sought was consistent with the common law.
76
A further articulation of the law-finding role emerged in
Bushell's Case itself. In the trial of William Penn and William Mead
which precipitated Bushell's Case, the defendants were charged with
unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace, not for violating the
Conventicles Act. For this reason, Penn and Mead's law-finding the-
with standards comprehensive to the defendant." Id. at 184-85. This notion that law was within
the comprehension of the average juror would also provide an important theme in the later de-
velopment of the law-finding right in colonial America. See infra notes 107 and 245 and ac-
companying text.
72 See GREEN, supra note 16, at 200-02. The Quaker Act made non-conformist religious
meetings unlawful, while the Conventicles Act elaborated on that law, making it illegal for
groups of five or more people to meet together under pretense of religion, when such a gathering
did not accord with the forms of the Anglican church. See id.
73 Id. at 204.
74 See id. at 205.
75 Id. at 206.
76 See id at 207.
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ory resembled the Leveller argument-that the jury must consider
whether the defendant "was being tried in accordance with the fun-
damental laws, 77 meaning the common law. Thus, they repeatedly
requested that the Court present the law to the jury "by which they
should measure the truth of the indictment, and the guilt."7 8 In a tract
written after his acquittal, Penn further articulated that the "crucial
point of reference for his jury was... the common law regarding the
requisites for unlawful assembly and disturbance of the peace."79 The
prosecutor and judge in his trial had misstated the elements needed to
prove such common law crimes, in effect creating a "self-proving"
indictment.80 Ideally, the jury should have itself decided whether the
indictment and judicial charge conformed to the law of unlawful as-
sembly, making its decisions based on its own understanding of the
law and after considering defendants' arguments about the appropri-
ate common law interpretation.8!
Chief Justice Vaughan's silence regarding these law-finding ar-
guments in his Bushell's Case opinion82 perhaps foretold the future of
those theories in English law-they never gained a foothold. In fact,
as Professor Langbein has described, "Bushel's Case made no practi-
cal difference to the conduct of criminal procedure," as judges "had
so many other channels of influence and control over the work of the
criminal jury.' 83 The powerful bench there was certainly not going to
cede its right to interpret the law. However, for a number of reasons,
the Leveller-Quaker notion of the jury's law-finding right would soon
gain prominence in the American colonies, although with con-
straints.84 Moreover, the notion that in finding law, juries were bound
to act as judges, would also carry on there.
'n Id. at 224.
78 Id. at 223.
79 Id. at227.
L Id.
"' See id. at 228.
82 The opinion rested solely on the jury's right to determine the facts, and was "remark-
able for how little it addressed the most volatile issues of the day." GREEN, supra note 16, at
239; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws in the historical argu-
ment for the right to nullify).
0 Langbein, supra note 37, at 298; see also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cmn. L. REv. 867, 903 (1994) ("In
England, although juries may have often disregarded the instructions of judges, they never ac-
quired dejure authority to do so.").
84 See infra notes 85-195 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of jury nullifi-
cation in America, beginning with the Zenger trial).
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2. Law-Finding in America: Importing the Right to Decide the Law
a. Colonial Origins: Zenger
The Zenger trial is famous for its impact on both freedom of
speech and jury rights in colonial America. The trial introduced po-
litical insights and theories "into the popular aspect of American po-
litical life" that would be crucial in the United States' founding later
in the century, and in years following.85 Thus, as did the statements of
the Quakers and the Levellers, the Zenger invocation of the jury's
right to decide the law provides important clues about what was
meant, at the time and later, by jury law-finding. Importantly, the no-
tions Zenger's defense espoused were consistent with its English ori-
gin. They also illustrated that even in this foundational case, the right
had clear limitations.
The Zenger trial marked the boiling point of a longstanding feud
between an opposition faction in New York and that colony's gover-
nor. 86 John Zenger himself was but a pawn in a broader debate-he
was a public printer who had agreed to publish the Weekly Journal, a
newspaper whose primary aim was to carp at Governor Cosby. Nev-
ertheless, after two months of publication, the state brought a sedi-
tious libel suit against Zenger himself.
At trial, Zenger's lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, perhaps the most
prominent advocate of his day, took on the law of seditious libel and
the trial judge's reading of it. At the time, seditious libel prosecutions
left little room for jury participation. Whether a publication was in
fact libelous was deemed a question of "law" to be determined by the
judge. Moreover, libel law held that truth was not a defense in a libel
suit.87 The jury's only role was to assess whether in fact there was a
publication and whether that publication had in fact referred to the
particular people as charged.88 Rather than argue those two factual
questions before the jury, Hamilton conceded them. 89 He focused in-
stead on two other points: that the jury generally should have a role in
interpreting the law in question and, in doing so in the libel context, it
85 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATivE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER 34 (Stanley Katz ed., 1963).
86 See id. at 2-7 (detailing the conflict leading to Zenger's trial for libel).
'7 See id. at 22, 68-70, 74. As the judge informed Hamilton: "[Tihe jury may find that
Zenger printed and published those papers, and leave it to the Court to judge whether they are
libelous." Id. at 78.
8' See id at 22.
89 See id. at 62.
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should find that statements must be false before they can be deemed
libelous.90
Throughout his argument before the judge and jury, Hamilton
returned to the central point: the jury had a right to "decide" or "de-
termine" the law. The structure of a libel prosecution provided by the
judge, he argued, deprived the jury of that right:
I know they have the right beyond all dispute to determine
both the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt of the
law, they ought to do so. This of leaving it to the judgment
of the Court whether the words are libelous or not in effect
renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many cases.91
He repeated this point some minutes later, stating that "where matter
of law is complicated with matter of fact, the jury have a right to de-
termine both' 92 -and did so again shortly thereafter, arguing that "it
is very plain that the jury are by law at libery ... to find both the law
and the fact in our case."93 In support of these claims, Hamilton
pointed to Bushell's Case,94 and alluded to the widespread fear that
judges' already wide powers made them ill-suited to enjoy a monop-
oly in interpreting laws.
95
What did Hamilton mean for the jury to do when he stated that
they, not the judge, were to "decide the law"? Although his lofty
rhetoric at times introduces ambiguity,96 Hamilton's argument was a
rather straightforward call for the jury to perform two legal tasks.
First, echoing Penn in the Bushell's Case trial, Hamilton made clear
that in determining the law, the jury was to assess for itself whether
the elements of libel were met. 97 It was for the "twelve men" to "un-
derstand the words in the information to be scandalous."98 Again
echoing Penn, Hamilton complained to the judge that the court had
not laid out clear standards for the jury to assess if those elements
were met: "how shall we know whether the words were spoke in a
90 See id.
9' Id. at 78.
92 l at 91.
9- I d at 92.
94 See id at 91 ("The right of the jury to find such a verdict as they in their conscience do
think is agreeable to their evidence is supported by the authority of Bushell's Case.").
9- See id. at 87 ("[How cautious ought we to be in determining by their judgments, espe-
cially... in the case of libels?").
96 Looking at Hamilton's rhetoric, Abramson claims that "Hamilton blended two argu-
ments about how the jury might exercise its right to decide questions of law." ABRAMSON,
supra note 1, at 74. One was an appeal for the jury to "nullify" law; the second is an appeal to
interpret the law. See id.
,7 See ALEXANDER, supra note 85, at 68.
" Id. at 78.
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scoffing and ironical manner, or seriously? Or how can you know
whether the man did not think as he wrote?" 99
Second, Hamilton argued that the judge and prosecution's under-
standing of the elements of libel misread the common law. As part of
its right to assess what comprised the elements of libel, the jury also
was obliged to correct any errors by the court in divining those ele-
ments from the common law. Hamilton thus urged the jury to con-
sider an additional element of libel that the trial judge rejected:
whether statements alleged to be libelous were true or false. True
statements, he maintained, could not be libelous. In making this ar-
gument, Hamilton did not appeal simply to jurors' common sense or
conscience. Rather, he appealed to the law itself and the jury's own
legal reasoning to convince them not only that falsity was a required
element, but was one which fell within their domain to assess. First,
he pointed to cases showing that falsity had in the past been a re-
quired element of libel, 1' ° and focused in particular on the case of the
Seven Bishops, where a jury had taken upon itself "to determine both
law and fact, and to understand the petition of the bishops to be no
libel, that is, to contain no falsehood nor sedition, and therefore found
them not guilty."101 He pointed to legislation passed by Parliament
eradicating the Star Chamber, asserting that "by the judgment of a
Parliament .... the jury are the proper judges of what is false at least,
if not of what is scandalous and seditious."'0 2 He called upon jurors'
reason, introducing a parade of horribles which would unfold if the
judge's broad definition of libel were accepted. 0 3 He reiterated skep-
ticism about judges' good faith interpretation of laws, and precedents
to that effect,104 and he closed with a rhetorical flourish about the
broad legal rights inherent in a democracy: "[t]he nature and the laws
of our country have given us a right -- the liberty -- both of exposing
and opposing arbitrary power ... by speaking and writing truth."' 0 5
In short, Hamilton confronted the Zenger jury with legal argu-
ments to convince them of his interpretation of the law. As he reiter-
ated, he was calling on them to serve as judges and provided them
with legal arguments to adjudicate. Just as Penn had argued, the jury
should assess on its own the elements of the asserted crime and
9 Id. at 77.
'00 See id. at 71-74.
'01 Id. at 85 (emphasis omitted).
102 Id. at 91 (emphasis omitted).
'03 See id. at 95-96 (arguing that should Zenger be found guilty of libel no one would be
safe from the reach of the government).
'04 See id. at 90-93.
105 Id. at 99.
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whether those elements were met. Thus, the jury could reject errone-
ous interpretations of the law given to them by the judge or state's
attorney. Even his broadest rhetoric to the jury is cabined within the
broader legal nature of his argument.10 6 Rather than a call to reject the
law, this was a call to apply it in good faith.
b. Founders and the Right to Decide the Law
Hamilton's notion of juries' law-finding right would carry forth
through the remainder of the colonial era and the founding era of the
United States.107 Several of the nation's founders thought and spoke at
length about the right to decide law. Once again, their discussions
continued the trend seen in the English cases and Zenger: that the
right to decide the law placed on juries the duty to act as judges, de-
termining the meaning and validity of a law based on legal standards.
It did not grant jurors broad discretion to decide issues based on more
general notions of justice that were counter to the law in place. Also,
continuing a theme voiced by Hamilton and one which remained
through the 18th and 19th centuries, their discussion of the law find-
ing right generally conditioned that right to general verdicts, where
questions of law and fact were mixed. Only in those cases, and not all
cases, did the juries possess the right to decide the law.
James Wilson, who was "second (if that) only to Madison in his
contributions to the Constitution,"' ' elaborated at length on the re-
spective roles of the judge and jury when questions of law and fact
are "inseparably blended" in a general verdict.'0 9 "When this is the
case," Wilson made clear, "[t]he jury must do their duty, and their
whole duty; they must decide the law as well as the fact."" 0 Wilson
was quick to outline narrow parameters of this "duty." In deciding the
law, jurors could not simply do as they pleased in rendering a verdict,
based on personal, moral or other reasons. Rather, "they must deter-
mine [legal] questions, as judges must determine them, according to
law."'' And, he clarified that "law, particularly the common law, is
governed by precedents, and customs, and authorities, and maxims:
106 See hiL at 93 ("[J]urymen are to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears,
and to make use of their own consciences and understandings in judging of the lives, liberties or
estates of their fellow subjects.").
107 See Scott, supra note 1, at 416 ("Zenger became a cornerstone in an American tradition
of the jury's right to decide the law. Unlike mother England, in every jurisdiction which ad-
dressed the question, state and federal, American juries had the right to decide the law."). See
generally Howe, supra note 51.
1os AMAR, supra note 54, at 99.
1o9 See JAMES WH-sON, 2 TiE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 540 (Robert Green McCloskey
ed., Harvard University Press 1967).
110 Id.
111 Id. at542 (emphasis added).
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those precedents, and customs, and authorities, and maxims are alike
obligatory upon jurors as upon judges, in deciding questions of
law."' 12 Wilson provided additional reasons to assure that this duty
was narrow and that jurors could carry it out responsibly. First, he
stated, jurors would know and understand the law. According to Wil-
son, "when he is called to judge .... every citizen, in a government
such as ours, should endeavor to acquire a reasonable knowledge of
[the criminal law's] principles and rules."'1 13 Second, voicing a theme
that would carry through the American law-finding cases of the 18th
and 19th centuries, Wilson believed that judges would still play the
central role in interpreting the law. Once a judge "inform[s] the jury
concerning the law, it is incumbent on the jury to pay much regard to
the information which they receive from judges."'1 14 In fact, instances
where a jury resists the "advice of a judge" were and should be rare;
such moments were limited to "[gross] misconduct" by the judge, or
on suspicion of his integrity.'
i 5
John Adams was also a vocal proponent of the law-finding right,
and elaborated on this right in 1771 writings. It is the juror's "right"
and "duty" to "find the verdict according to his own best understand-
ing, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the di-
rection of the court."' 16 Lest the use of "conscience" be interpreted
too broadly,' 7 Adams' elaboration of this notion suggests that he was
referring generally to jurors' need to consult their legal understand-
ings, judgments, and knowledge. Echoing Wilson, he made this point
clear when he described in detail the sources jurors should consult in
"finding" the law:
The general rules of law and common regulations of society,
under which ordinary transactions arrange themselves, are
well enough known to ordinary jurors. The great principles of
the constitution are intimately known .. .it is scarcely ex-
travagant to say they are drawn in and imbibed with the
nurse's milk and first air. Now, should the melancholy case
arise that the judges should give their opinions to the jury
112 Id.
113 Id at 549. The trial itself was viewed as a mechanism to educate jurors, with the
judge's instructions playing the crucial role. See AMAR, supra note 54, at 93-94.
114 Wilson, supra note 109, at 539.
115 See id. at 542.
116 JOHN ADAMS, 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAS 255 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston,
Charles C. Little and James Brown 1850).
117 Pro-nullification scholars often quote Adams in support of their historical argument.
See, e.g., Kunstler, supra note 44, at 75; Scheflin, supra note 1, at 174-75.
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against one of these fundamental principles, j]uries have a
right and a duty to ignore those opinions. 18
Both Wilson and Adams therefore conceived of the right to decide the
law as a duty to apply well-known legal rules to cases at hand. Like
Hamilton in Zenger, they also saw it as inevitably emerging from the
right to render general verdicts.
c. Federal Cases after the Founding
Although not expressly stated in the Constitution, this founding
understanding of juries' law-finding right would soon emerge in fed-
eral trials, both in the Supreme Court and in lower federal courts.
119
The right to decide the law would reach its pinnacle around the
Revolution and the first decades of the 19th century; it diminished in
stature over the course of the 19th century; 120 and in 1895, the Su-
preme Court flatly rejected the right in Sparf. Once again, pro-
nullification scholars exuberantly point to the pre-Sparf period to
show the existence of a right analogous to that which they propose for
today.121 However, a careful examination of these cases shows yet
again that jury law-finding was a narrow task, and, consistent with the
notions developed by Hamilton, Adams, and Wilson, one which
obliged jurors to follow the law. Moreover, the clear limits of the right
to decide the law emerged in another way: jurors did not enjoy the
right to determine the constitutionality of statutes, as that type of
judgment was deemed beyond jurors' capacity. Finally, consistent
with Hamilton, Adams, and Wilson's statements, courts consistently
found that the jury's "right" to decide the law was not absolute. In-
stead, it was limited to those occasions where a general verdict inevi-
tably required a consideration of law and fact together. Otherwise,
judges were the sole interpreters of the law. This framework suggests
that the driving force behind the "right" was the right to issue a gen-
eral verdict itself, and ultimately the inviolability of the jury's fact-
finding role. In other words, it was based on jurors' capacity as legal
decisionmakers (akin to judges), rather than as alternative law-makers
(or law nullifiers). In mere decades, this weak pedestal for the law-
11 ADAMS, supra note 116, at 254-55.
19 See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2 & amend. VI & amend. VIL Leipold notes the surprising
lack of discussion of the jury's law-finding right at the time of the Founding--either in the
founding debates, the debates over the Bill of Rights, or the Federalist Papers. See Leipold,
supra note 1, at 289-90.
120 Several powerful lower court opinions denied the jury's law-finding right. See United
States v. Battiste, 24 F.Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545); United States v.
Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 131-36 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
121 See, e.g., Scheflin, supra note 1, at 175-77.
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finding right would collapse toward the dichotomy we now have to-
day: that the jury has a right to issue general verdicts, and concomi-
tant with that right is the power (but not the right) to decide the law.
i. Deciding the Law: Interpreting the Law as Would a Judge
Justice Jay's opinion in Georgia v. Brailsford,122 a case decided
only six years after the Constitution's enactment, clearly established
the jury's law-finding right within the new nation's legal framework.
At the same time, the opinion's words and the conduct of the trial it-
self illustrated the narrow contours of that right. Brailsford involved a
dispute over the rightful possession of an outstanding debt. Georgia
claimed title to the bond under which the debt was owed, pointing to
its 1782 act of confiscation from alien enemies, of which Brailsford
(the original creditor) was one.1 3 After informing the jury of the
Court's conclusion that legally, Brailsford should prevail because his
"right to recover [his debts] revived" after peace was struck between
Britain and its former colony, John Jay delivered his famous instruc-
tions to the jury: "you have nevertheless a right to take upon your-
selves to judge of both [fact and law], and to determine the law as
well as the fact in controversy., 124 While nullification scholars have
pounced on this language,1 5 Jay's further elaboration of the jury's
role under the right evinces its modest nature and the duty of the jury
to engage in legal analysis in performing its role:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the
good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of
the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to
decide.... [W]e have no doubt [that] you will pay that re-
spect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For... it is
presumed... that the court are the best judges of law. 126
Heeding Jay's words, 127 the jury returned from deliberations to ask
the Court two purely legal questions: whether the Georgia Act com-
pletely vested the title from Brailsford, and, if so, whether the peace
treaty with Britain revived defendants' right in the debt.1 28 On hearing
'2 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
12 See id. at 1 (stating that the case was tried under the Court's original jurisdiction, so it
took place before the Supreme Court).
124 Id. at 4.
125 See, e.g., Horowitz & Willging, supra note 15, at 167; Kunstler, supra note 44, at 75;
Scheflin, supra note 1, at 175-76; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 14, at 58.
'26 Brailsford, 3 U.S. at 4.
,27 He also warned them not to consider the comparative situations of Georgia and the
defendants. See id. at 4-5.
'28 See id. at 5.
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the Court's answers to those questions of law-that the Act did not
vest the debt from Brailsford, but only sequestered it, and such se-
questration ended with the later peace agreement-the jury returned a
verdict for Brailsford without deliberation. 29 The Brailsford jury thus
exercised its right to decide the law by considering the two crucial
legal questions in the case, but did so by deferring to the court's
judgment on both questions. In practice, then, the jury's actions were
consistent not only with Jay's instruction, but with the modest, legal-
istic conception of deciding the law that Wilson and Adams had de-
scribed in theory.
Although no other Supreme Court cases at the time elaborated
further upon the right to decide law, 130 lower court cases, including
decisions by Justices riding circuit, were consistent in their explana-
tions of the right. In a 1793 federal trial in Pennsylvania, Justices
Wilson and Iredell sat for the trial of Gideon Henfield, who was ac-
cused of violating domestic and international laws by committing il-
legal privateering against foreign ships.131 In instructing the jury, Jus-
tice Wilson explained that "the jury, in a general verdict, must decide
both law and fact."'32 But, he added, "this did not authorize them to
decide it as they pleased; they were as much bound by to decide law
as the judges: the responsibility was equal upon both."'133 To ensure
that they made their decision based on law, the Justices took great
pains to explain their view of the law to the jury, for "it is the duty of
the court to explain the law to the jury, and give it to them in direc-
tion."'134 The Justices proceeded to elaborate on international law,
U.S. treaty law, the incorporation of those treaties into domestic law
through the Supremacy Clause, and the legal duties of citizens to fol-
low these laws. 135 Finally, the Justices made other observations re-
garding "legal principles which had been agitated in the course of the
trial.'
136
A third early case outlining the responsibilities that inhered with
the right to decide the law is United States v. Smith & Ogden.
137
There, defendants were indicted for initiating a military expedition
"9 See id.
130 Brailsford comprised the last jury trial held by the Supreme Court. In Bingham v. Cab-
bot, Justice Iredell suggested briefly that although juries should respect a court's views on the
law, "they are not bound to deliver a verdict conformably to them." See Bingham v. Cabbot, 3
Dall. 19,33 (1795).
"'1 See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1105-06 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
32 Id. at 1121.
133 Id. (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 1120.
135 See id.
1 6 Id. at 1121.
'37 27 F. Cas. 1186 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,341A).
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against "dominions" of a foreign power with which the United States
was at peace.138 The judge instructed the jury that the "law is now
settled that [the right to judge the law] appertains to a jury in all
criminal cases."' 139 Like Iredell, however, he emphasized: "[b]ut the
jury is therefore not above the law. In exercising this right, they at-
tach to themselves the character of judges, and as such are as much
bound by the rules of legal decision as those who preside upon the
bench."'14 To endeavor to decide the law as well as fact, the judge
instructed, comprised an assumption of "responsibility" and intro-
duced the "hazard of judging incorrectly upon questions of mere
law.'
41
In the 1830 case of United States v. Wilson,142 where Wilson was
charged with robbing the United States mails, a judge reminded a jury
of the responsibilities and duties they shouldered if they ignored the
judge's instructions in favor of their own interpretation of the law.
First, he implored them, "it is a very old, sound and valuable maxim
in law that the court answers to questions of law and the jury to
facts;" 143 with the law in this case clearly settled, he asked, "[i]f this
jury should differ from [that law], can any man say what is the law of
mall robbery as practically applied in this district?"'144 Nevertheless, if
they did choose to go beyond the law as instructed, he implored them:
[A]ct on the same rule under which you would be guided as a
magistrate or judge on the oath and responsibility of office.
Then you will not err ... [R]eflect, deliberate, forget all ap-
peals to your feelings, or any modes of operating on your
judgment but such as are pointed out by the law or evi-
dence. 14
5
A valuable source of evidence regarding the operation of the law-
finding right also emerged from Congress' enactment of the Alien
and Sedition Act in 1798.146 Under that law, "the jury who shall try
the cause [had the] right to determine the law and the fact, under the
direction of the court, as in other cases."147 For the legal historian's
purposes, the Act's language affirmed both the existence of, and
138 See id.
139 Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 162 (1895) (citation omitted).
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 id.
142 United States v. Wilson, 28 F. Cas. 699 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 16.730).
143 Id. at 712.
144 Id.
'45 Il at 712-13. The judge specifically called on the jury to consider the intent of Con-
gress in passing the law. See id. at 712.
'46 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
147 Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
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Congress' approval of, the law-finding right. 148 As Professor Howe
has explained, this language voiced the "propriety of allowing the
jury to determine the ultimate legal question of the substantive
meaning of the statute." 149 Importantly, however, the inclusion of the
words "under the direction of the court" also reflected the limiting
notions voiced by Wilson and others-that the jury's role was con-
fined to one of interpreting the law through legal principles, and for
that reason, deference to the judge was generally due. As an Ohio
Court stated in interpreting the phrase "under the direction of the
court" in that state's bill of rights: "[The jury's] right to judge of the
law, is a right to be exercised only under the direction of the Court;
and, if they go aside from that direction, and determine the law incor-
rectly, they depart from their duty, and commit a public wrong.'' 150
In perhaps the most famous and controversial case under the se-
ditious libel statute, Justice Chase articulated how a jury was to pro-
ceed in assessing the facts and the law under the statute-namely, as a
judge would. 151 First, he maintained, the jury must inquire whether
the defendant "committed all or any of the facts alleged in the indict-
ment to have been done by him."'152 If the jury concludes that a defen-
dant did commit such acts, its next task is to inquire "whether the
doing such facts have been made criminal and punishable by the stat-
ute of the United States, on which the traverser is indicted.",5' To do
this, Chase counseled:
[The jury] must peruse the statute, and carefully examine
whether the facts charged and proved are within the provi-
sions of it. If the words that create the offence are plain and
intelligible, they must then determine whether the offence
proved is of the species of criminality charged in the indict-
ment; but if the words are ambiguous or doubtful, all con-
struction should be rejected.154
Once again, law-finding involved careful legal interpretation, includ-
ing close textual reads and considerations of vagueness.
148 Once again, nullification scholars believe they have found evidence to support a his-
torical right to nullify. See Scheflin, supra note 1, at 176; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 14,
at 58.
149 Howe, supra note 51, at 587.
150 Montgomery v. Ohio, I 1 Ohio 424,427 (1842).
151 The case, United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709), is
famous because it led to the impeachment trial of Justice Chase. The aspect of the case where
Chase outlined a jury's role in interpreting a statute was not a source of debate, however.
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Although a number of other early federal cases mentioned the
right to decide the law in cursory fashion, few did so in significant
detail. Nevertheless, the structure of those trials, and the brief discus-
sion of the right in those proceedings, further support the narrow
scope of jury law-finding. Essentially, these trials were structured to
allow for a full consideration of legal arguments by the jury, making
clear that the jury's law-finding role comprised precisely what the
term suggested-a focus on the interpretation of the law at hand, or
on other legal matters central to a case. Consistent with past cases and
Congress' understanding that law-finding was to proceed "under the
direction of the court," these cases generally required that the judge
"state to the jury [his] opinion of the law arising on the facts."'155 The
judge then allowed the lawyers to present their interpretive take of the
law in question, for if the jury "were to decide the law, it seemed to
follow that they had a right to hear the arguments of counsel upon the
law." 156 And although these lawyers often used soaring rhetoric as
part of those arguments, at their root, these arguments focused on the
application and interpretation of the law in question.
United States v. Hodges157 provides a colorful example of such a
trial. Hodges was accused of treason for returning several deserters to
the British Army. He claimed that his acts were compelled by the
British Army's threats to destroy his town and take wives and chil-
dren hostage. One of the two trial judges instructed the jury that the
law of treason did not allow them to consider intent in their assess-
ment of Hodges' acts because "[w]hen the act itself amounts to trea-
son it involves the intention" required.' 58 Relatedly, he stated that the
British threats could not be considered a justification for Hodges'
treachery. 59 Nevertheless, he reminded the jury that they "are not
bound to conform to this opinion, because they have a right in all
criminal cases to decide on the law and the facts., 160 Hodges' lawyer
then rose to speak, attempting to persuade the jury that the judge's
interpretation of the law was flawed. Despite occasional high rheto-
ric,' 6' he returned again and again to straightforward legal arguments
155 Case of Fries, 9 F.Cas. 924, 930 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127); see also United States
v. Hodges, 26 F. Cas. 332, 332 (C.C.D. Md. 1815) (No. 15,374) ("The Court said they were
bound to declare the law whenever they were called upon in civil or criminal cases; in the latter,
however, it was their duty to inform the jury that they were not obliged to take their direction as
the law.").
156 virginia v. Zimmerman, 28 F. Cas. 1227, 1227 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,968).
'-7 26 F. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Md. 1815) (No. 15,374).
151 Id. at 334.
159 See id. The other judge disagreed with both of these conclusions. See id.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 332 (telling jurors that they were responsible "only to God, to the prisoner,
and to their own consciences").
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for the jury to weigh. First, he pointed to precedent, showing that in a
previous treason case, a court had held that treacherous intent was
required.162 He alluded more broadly to his "deliberate examination of
all the authorities, of a thorough investigation of the law of treason in
all its forms,"' 63 which, he asserted, all required a showing of intent to
prove treason. Next, he pointed to the logical flaws of the judge's
"constructive treason"' 64 analysis, arguing that judging such alleged
acts without regard to intent would lead to rampant criminal liability;
"[n]ay, half Prince George's county would come within [the prosecu-
tion's] baleful influence."'165 Finally, he pointed to the fact that the
second judge overseeing the trial did not agree with his brother's
opinion on the law as further evidence of the weakness of that legal
position. 166 Overall, the lawyer made clear that his was a legal argu-
ment, and not a more general plea for lenience:
Is it possible that in this favoured land, this last asylum of
liberty, blest with all that can render a nation happy at home
and respected abroad, [this constructive treason analysis]
should be law? No. ... I say there is no colour for this slan-
der upon our jurisprudence. Had I thought otherwise I should
have asked for mercy, not for law.167
Ultimately, the jury acquitted the defendant. Other trials followed this
same pattern of a battle of legal presentations before the jury,168 al-
though over the course of the 19th century, judges became somewhat
more aggressive in instructing the jury on the law.169
162 See id. at 335.
163 Id. at 336.
VA Id.
165 Id.
166 See idL This dissonance between two judges' instructions was not rare. See infra note
241.
167 Hughes, 26 F. Cas. at 336 (emphasis added).
168 See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 26 F. Cas. 1033 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 15, 648);
Stettinius v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1322, 1333 (C.C.D. D.C. 1839) (No. 13,387); United
States v. Fenwick, 25 F. Cas. 1062, 1063-64 (C.C.D. D.C. 1836) (No. 15,086) (disallowing a re-
argument in opposition to a judicial instruction to the jury).
169 See, e.g., Lynch, 26 F. Cas. at 1035 (stating that the court "fully expressfed] their opin-
ion to the jury what the law was, and felt bound in the present case to charge the jury distinctly
and positively upon the points raised by the prisoners' councel"); Stettinius, 22 F. Cas. at 1333
(instructing that "the jury ought to respect [the judge's] instruction, and not lightly substitute
their own often crude expositions, or the sometimes wild or interested suggestions of counsel,
for the deliberate, calm, and impartial opinion of judges, who ought to be, and generally are,
selected for their knowledge of the law and their judicial integrity"); Mattingly v. United States,
16 F. Cas. 1144, 1145 (C.C.D. D.C. 1844) (No. 9,295) (instructing the jury that they had the
right "to determine both the law and the fact, but that in matters of law you ought to follow the
opinion of the court").
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Even as the right to decide the law faded from the scene in the
late 1800s, its defenders continued to cast it in the narrow terms de-
scribed above. In his long dissent in Sparf, Justice Gray provided a
spirited defense of the right to decide the law. Nevertheless, his dis-
cussion of the duties involved in determining law showed once again
that the right was conceived in narrow terms:
The duty of the jury, indeed, like any other duty imposed
upon any officer or private person by the law of his country,
must be governed by the law, and not by willfulness or ca-
price. The jury must ascertain the law as well as they can.
Usually they will, and safely may, take it from the instruc-
tions of the court. But if they are satisfied on their con-
sciences that the law is other than as laid down to them by the
court, it is their right and their duty to decide by the law as
they know or believe it to be.
170
Echoing previous judges, Gray's confidence in the jury to perform
this legal assessment stemmed from his belief that "[t]he rules and
principles of the criminal law are, for the most part, elementary and
simple, and easily understood by jurors taken from the body of peo-
ple.' 71
From its birth until its death, therefore, the right to decide the
law meant for the jury to conduct a legal inquiry into the prosecution
in question, adhering to the law and legal principles already in place.
The basis for jury decisionmaking was to be jurors' legal reasoning,
and their good-faith interpretation of the formal laws on the books.
Case after case demonstrates that to go beyond that narrow inquiry in
favor of their own notions of justice and morality would have clearly
overstepped the right.
ii. The Denial of Jury Review 172
Jurors were granted discretion to perform other legal duties be-
yond simply interpreting particular provisions of statutory or common
law. In Hill v. Scott, a federal judge left it to the jury to determine
whether a given statute applied in a case of USury.173 In another case, a
jury found that a court had no jurisdiction over a given defendant. 174
170 Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 172 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 173.
172 This author takes the term "jury review" from Professor Amar, who uses it to connote
the equivalent of judicial review for the jury-namely, assessing the constitutionality of laws.
See generally AMAR, supra note 54, at 98.
173 See Hill v. Scott, 12 F. Cas. 175, 176 (C.Ct. D.C. 1838) (No. 6,498).
174 See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 830 (D.C.D. S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (dis-
cussing a New Jersey case where a jury had concluded such).
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But the scope of the jury-finding right was not unlimited; in addition
to the limits on how the jury was to go about determining the law,
there were also limits on which functions it could exercise under that
right. In particular, a clear ceiling was erected regarding the question
of 'jury review": whether jurors had the right to interpret the Consti-
tution, and specifically, whether they could acquit defendants when
they considered a law in violation of the Constitution. Although per-
sons argued both sides of this debate in theory, the evidence suggests
that juries could not perform "jury review" under the federal Consti-
tution. This denial of jury review establishes a second important limit
on the jury's right to decide the law, confining its role to certain as-
pects of trial decisionmaking rather than allowing it to be a player (as
even judges could be after Marbury) in the broader democratic proc-
ess, as jury review would have allowed.
A number of early constitutional thinkers believed that jurors
ought to have played a key structural role within democratic govern-
ment. 7 5 Following naturally from these beliefs was the notion that as
part of the right to "decide the law," jurors possessed the right to as-
sess the constitutionality of laws and to acquit defendants when they
determined a law to be in violation of the Constitution. 76 When Ad-
ams proclaimed that "[t]he great principles of the constitution are in-
timately known [by ordinary jurors,]' '177 he seemed to be confirming
this view.
Despite the logic of this position, federal courts assessing this
question, led by justices and judges who acknowledged the right to
"decide the law" in other contexts, refused to recognize jury review
from the outset. 7 8 In a 1798 case, Justice Patterson, who had been in
175 See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher's Stone: Dualist Democracy and
the Jury, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 175 (1998) (arguing for the jury's role within constitutional
politics). Jefferson thought of the jury as part of the necessity of "introduc[ing] the people into
every department of government." AMAR, supra note 54, at 95 (citing letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to L'Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). Tocqueville described the jury as a "political institution... to which
the execution of the laws is entrusted . k. ." l (citing I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 293-94 (Phillips Bradley ed. 1945)). John Taylor of Caroline characterized the jury
as the "lower judicial bench" in a bicameral jury, while anti-federalist tracts dubbed juries as the
democratic wing of the judicial branch. Id. (citing JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209 (W. Stark ed.,
1950)).
176 See generally id. at 98-100 (discussing the jury's ability to go outside the law when
constitutionally required).
'77 Id. at 103.
178 Although Professor Amar discusses the "strong arguments" for the "plausibility" of
jury review, he does not argue that it in fact existed in history. Rather, "the mere fact of [the
arguments'] strong plausibility shows how strikingly powerful the jury might have become had
post-1800 history unfolded differently." See AMAR, supra note 54, at 103. Magliocca, on the
other .hand, asserts that jury review was widely accepted in colonial America and the early
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the majority in Brailsford, explicitly denied the contention that juries
were to assess the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Act:
"[Y]ou have nothing whatever to do with the constitutionality or un-
constitutionality of the sedition law.... [U]ntil this law is declared
null and void by a tribunal competent for the purpose, its validity
cannot be disputed.', 179 Two years later, Justice Chase in Callender,
after expounding upon jurors' right to "decide the law" in Callender
itself 8° and in previous cases,181 agreed with Patterson, rejecting the
defense's position that it was entitled to convince the jury that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional. Specifically, Callender's attorney
argued that, given the jury's right to decide the law, and the Constitu-
tion's status as the supreme law of the country, the jury possessed a
"right to consider the constitution;"182 hence "if the law of congress
under which we are indicted, be an infraction of the constitution, it
has not the force of law, and if you were to find the traverser guilty
under such an act, you would violate your oaths."'8 3 While Justice
Chase did not question the jury's right to decide law,184 he did deny
that the jury could assess the constitutionality of the Act, citing the
text and structure of the Constitution,85 framers' intent, 86 Congres-
sional intent in passing the Alien and Sedition Act, 8 7 the illogic of the
asserted right,188 the negative practical consequences rendered by
such jury review, 189 the "usurpation" of judicial power that jury re-
United States. See generally Magliocta, supra note 175. However, Magliocca can only point to
a single case where a federal judge allowed a lawyer to argue the unconstitutionality of an Act.
See id. at 195-96 (citing United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (C.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No.
16,700)). In fact, Magliocca's overall theme that the right of jury law-finding was considered
more appropriate in the constitutional realm is belied by the cases described in this Section.
Courts seemed most troubled by the law-finding right precisely when it was argued that it im-
plied the right to jury review. This is perhaps why some of today's nullification scholars shy
away from the suggestion that jurors can assess the constitutionality of statutes. See, e.g., Sche-
flin & Van Dyke, supra note 11, at 166.
179 Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646).
180 See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 253 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709)
("[W]e all know that juries have the right to decide the law....").
181 See generally Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924,930 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127).
'82 Callender, 25 F.Cas. at 253.
183 Id.
184 See supra note 180.
185 See Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256 (citing Article L the Supremacy Clause, and the "oath
and affirmation" clause).
186 See id. at 255 (stating that it was never "intended by framers of the constitution ... that
[the constitutionality of a statute] should ever be submitted to the examination of a jury").
'87 See id. ("I cannot possibly believe that congress intended, by the statute, to grant a right
to a petit jury to declare a statute void.").
188 See id. ("If the statute should be held void by a jury, it would seem ihat they could not
claim a right to such decision under an act that they themselves consider as mere waste paper.");
see also id. at 253 (calling Callender's argument a "non-sequitur").
189 See id. ("[Tihe evident consequences of this right in juries will be, that a law of con-
gress will be in operation in one state and not in another.").
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view would entail,190 and the jury's incompetence to perform such a
role.'9' Justice Chase drew a clear distinction between the right to de-
cide the law, which he accepted, and jury review, which he did not:
"It is one thing to decide what the law is, on the facts proved, and an-
other and a very different thing, to determine that the statute produced
is no law."' 192 He thus announced that "the court will not allow the
counsel for [Callender] to argue before the petit jury, that they have a
right to decide on the constitutionality of the statute ... ,193 Two
hours later, the jury pronounced Callender guilty. 194 Even as the
jury's law-finding right remained in place over the course of the 19th
century, judges continuously rejected the jury's purported right to
decide the constitutionality of a law. 95
In addition to these cases, other clues also evince that jury re-
view was not considered part of the jury right to decide law. First,
scholars occasionally suggest that Justice Chase's subsequent im-
peachment by the House of Representatives shows that his denial of
jury review was counter to core American values at the time.196 To the
contrary, the impeachment trial elicited a remarkable dearth of con-
cern for this particular aspect of Chase's behavior on the bench. In
fact, the striking lack of discussion over jury review during the Senate
impeachment hearings suggests that this facet of Chase's actions was
not at all troubling to the House that impeached him, the lawyers who
were prosecuting him, or the Senators who were considering his re-
moval.
Although the impetus of Chase's impeachment was a complex
array of legal, political, philosophical, and personal factors,197 the de-
'9 See id. ("[T]he judicial power of the United States is the only proper and competent
authority to decide whether any statute made by congress... is contrary to... the federal con-
stitution."); see also id. at 257 ("[1If the jury should exercise that power, they would thereby
usurp the authority entrusted by the constitution of the United States to this court.").
'1 See id, at 253 ("[]t is not competent to the jury to decide on this point .....
192 Id. at 255.
"' Id. at 257.
"4 See id. at 258.195 See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1332-33 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815) ("[Ihe constitution did not design to create or recognize any such power .... "); Stet-
tinius v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1322, 1334 (C.C.D. D.C. 1839) (No. 13,387) (affirming a
judge's instruction that "the jury ought not to take upon themselves, in opposition to the opinion
of the court, to decide an act of congress to be unauthorized by the constitution, and therefore
not law"); United States v. Shive, 27 F. Cas. 1065, 1066-67 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 16,278)
(refusing to allow the jury to consider the constitutionality of an act of Congress).
196 See Magliocca, supra note 175, at 207 ("Although Chase escaped conviction by a few
votes, a clear message was sent... validating past attempts to invoke [jury review].").
197 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 15-134 (1992). The bitter
divide between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans over the Sedition Act's constitutional-
ity was perhaps the key backdrop to the Callender-Fries decisions. See id. at 48-49. However,
the dispute also reflected the more general ideological rivalry between the Federalists and Jef-
fersonian Republicans. See generally Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The
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bate directly addressed his behavior in three cases: Fries, Callender,
and an 1803 Baltimore trial in which Chase read a charge to a grand
jury castigating recent Jeffersonian decisions. 98 Notably, although
they relayed in painstaking detail his misdeeds at these trials, the
eight articles of impeachment levied against Chase failed to mention
his emphatic denial of jury review at Callender's trial.1 99 Apparently,
Chase's allowing a potentially tainted juror onto the Callender jury
(the second article of impeachment), his not allowing a defense wit-
ness to testify (the third), and his berating and interrupting of lawyers
in a disrespectful way (the fourth) each sparked greater concern than
his denial of jury review. Moreover, the managers of the case against
Chase did not once mention in their opening or closing statements
Chase's denial of jury review in the trial as a separate wrong; their
witnesses during direct and cross-examination were equally silent on
the topic. 2°° Their case focused on the specific misdeeds alleged in the
impeachment articles. When they discussed Chase's denial of jury
review at all, they only did so in the context of the manner in which
he denied it.
201
Ironically, only Chase's defense team dwelled on his denial of
jury review, doing so to justify Justice Chase's ire toward Callender's
counsel. They characterized the attempt to argue constitutionality to
the jury as a last ditch lawyer's trick to circumvent a clear losing ar-
gument:
Could Mr. Chase, who for nearly fifty years has been at the
bar and on the bench, of great acknowledged talents, be igno-
rant of the aim and object of counsel? And with his mind
English, The Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NW.
U.L. REv. 106 (1989).
19s Chase warned in the latter case that Jeffersonian changes to the laws would "take away
all security for property and personal liberty... and our Republican constitution will sink into a
mobocracy .. " REHNQUIST, supra note 197, at 52.
199 The first article addressed Chase's behavior at the Fries trial, alleging that he preju-
diced the trial, unfairly denied certain arguments to Fries' counsel, and would not allow counsel
to argue certain points of law to the jury. See REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL
CHASE 9-10 (1805). The second through fifth articles addressed his behavior at the Callender
trial, alleging that he improperly allowed a prejudiced juror to remain (Art. II), would not allow
a defense witness to testify (Art. Il), displayed "injustice," "partiality" and "intemperance"
throughout the trial through his refusal to postpone the trial, constant interruptions, and "un-
usual, rude and contemptuous" expressions (Art. IV), and violated Virginia law by allowing
Callender to be placed in custody prematurely (Art. V). The remaining articles involved his
grand jury charge in the Baltimore case. See id.
200 See generally id, at 1-140.
201 One prosecutor argued that Chase "treated the counsel for Callender as mushrooms,"
and "turn[ed] the counsel into ridicule." See id. at 114. A witness testified that he had been
"interrupted oftener by Judge Chase [in Callender] than I ever was during sixteen years prac-
tice[.]" Id. at 35. The witness also complained that Chase did not consult his fellow trial judge in
making key decisions. See id. at 35.
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made up as to the constitutionality of the law, was he fit a
cypher to see the jury misled .... The very object was disre-
spectful to the authority of the court, and with becoming dig-
nity he stopped the counsel, in language suited to the occa-
sion which gave it birth.202
Arguing the point even more bluntly, his defense counsel reiterated
Justice Chase's arguments at trial: "[tlhe maddest enthusiasts for the
rights of jurors-their most zealous advocates have never contended
for such a right before the cases of Fries and Callender. Whether a
law exists ... ? The decision of these questions have always been
allowed the exclusive right of the court. '20 3 And repeating the more
narrow meaning of "deciding the law" as it had been defined in other
cases, they reiterated one final time:
Nay the very right claimed on behalf of jurors, that they may
determine what is the true construction of the law, and
whether the case is within its provisions, of itself necessarily
presupposes, and is predicated upon the existence of a law,
the true construction or meaning of which they are to deter-
mine.2 4
Once again, they closed: "And will any man say that under such cir-
cumstances, it was not proper to interrupt the counsel?"20' 5 Thus, with
Justice Chase's justiceship on the line, his defenders did not minimize
his denial of jury review.206 Instead, they characterized the mere ar-
gument for jury review as so outrageous that Justice Chase's resulting
outburst was understandable. Chase's accusers said nothing to rebut
this argument.
Perhaps the Chase team's confidence stemmed from the fact that
not only had federal judges rejected Callender's argument,207 but
202 l at 159.
203 Id. at 209. "What has been allowed to the jurors as their incidental right on the general
issue? Not to decide whether there is an existing law, or whether a law is in force, but to declare
the true construction of an existing law, and whether the case at issue comes within the true
construction of such law." Id.
24 la at 209.
205 Id. at 230.
206 Chase's defenders took a notably different tack to rebut the article of impeachment that
charged Chase with denying the jury the right to decide the law in the Case of Fries. Instead of
justifying the purported denial, as they did with the denial of jury review, they argued that the
trial record in fact showed that he had allowed the jury to exercise that right.
207 See Presser, supra note 197, at 138 (noting that even the strongest Jeffersonian judges
of the day had rejected "jury review" claims). This is not surprising, since the very notion that
the judiciary itself could render statutes void was still in its early years. See Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review); see also Simson, supra note
37, at 498 (pointing out that juries in colonial times likely lacked the right to decide the validity
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Congress, too, had clearly pronounced the same limitation on the
jury's right to decide the law only several years before. In passing the
Alien and Sedition Act, Congress chose its words carefully to avoid
allowing the jury to nullify the Act itself as unconstitutional. During
the floor debate, one House member worried that the Act's language
granting the jury the "right to determine the law and fact" would be
construed too broadly, and, in particular, "the effect of this amend-
ment would be, to put it into the power of a jury to declare that this is
an unconstitutional law, instead of leaving this to be determined,
where it ought to be determined, by the Judiciary. ' 20 8 In response to
this concern, another Congressman added to the statute the words "as
in other cases," in order to show "clearly that [the act's] intention was
only to declare that juries should have the same power to decide on
the criminality of the act, which they had in other criminal cases.' 2 9
Thus, the Act's final language, that "the jury who shall try the cause
shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direc-
tion of the court, as in other cases,' 21° comprised an attempt to cabin
the jury's right to decide the law to a good-faith interpretation of the
statute's meaning. It also reflected the assumption among 1898 law-
makers that "in other cases," juries also lacked the power to render a
statute void.
This consistent denial of "jury review" is particularly damaging
to the nullification historical account because jury review would have
been similar (though still less sweeping) to the right sought by today's
nullification scholars: a jury's right to refuse to enforce a law because
they deem it unjust or otherwise invalid.211 Justice Chase and others
mustered numerous arguments why jury review was not a sound doc-
trine,212 but the core concern was that jury review would allow the
jury to go far beyond the limited legalistic, trial-based duty envi-
sioned for the law-finding right. As one scholar observed in discuss-
ing a mid-19th century debate regarding jury law-finding under the
Massachusetts Constitution, there were two distinct notions of jury
law-finding at play in those years. "First, there was the view that the
jury could respond to a higher law; if the statute before it was iniqui-
tous, the jury should reach its conclusion on the basis of natural laws
of Crown statutes because "the colonies lacked jurisdiction to consider the conformity of legis-
lative acts to fundamental, or constitutional, norms").
208 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2136 (1798) (statement of Rep. James Bayard, Delaware).
20 Id. at 2137; see also Simson, supra note 37, at 502.
210 Act of July 14, 1798 (Alien and Sedition Act), ch. 74, § 3, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (emphasis
added).
211 See supra notes 5-6, 11-18, and accompanying text.
212 See supra at 178-184.
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that were more truly just. '213 On the other hand, the jury was thought
only to be "qualified to determine the contents of the positive law,
using the judge's instruction as evidence."214 Although these two po-
sitions did not always clash openly, the question of jury review placed
them in stark contrast, for "[t]he codification of natural rights was
thought to be the United States Constitution" and "the reliance on a
higher law was usually viewed as a constitutional judgment.'' 2 15
Therefore, in leaving "jury review" outside the parameters of the right
to decide the law, the federal courts flatly rejected the notion that ju-
rors could find against the law based on their notions of higher jus-
tice. Rather, their role was confined to accepting the law that was in
place and interpreting its legal meaning as best they could-usually
by deferring to the judge's instructions.216
iii. Tying the Right to the General Verdict
From the outset, a third limitation was placed on the jury's right
to decide law: the right only existed when the jury was rendering a
general verdict where the law and facts were inextricably intermin-
gled. This condition carried several implications. First, it limited the
occasions for jury law-finding. Second, it suggested that the right to
decide the law was not an absolute right. Rather, it was a necessary
consequence of the jury's right to issue a general verdict with impu-
nity. In other words, it derived from a concern over the jury's role in
the administration of trials-an important concern, but not nearly as
grand as today's pro-nullification notion that juries must assume a
more affirmative role within the democratic process. If accepted in
earlier centuries, that broader notion would naturally have led to the
application of the "right to decide the law" in all cases, not only gen-
21 Note, Thre Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 178
(1964).
234 1d. at 179-80.
215 Id. at 178.
216 Scheflin tries to wriggle out of this problem by acknowledging that juries can not strike
down laws based on unconstitutionality, nor could they in the past. See Scheflin, supra note 1,
at 169 n.2. This does not solve his problem, however, at least in terms of his historical argu-
ment. Perhaps the predominant reason for the discomfort with jury review was that interpreting
the constitution involved the consideration of more ephemeral factors of "higher law" and jus-
tice, along with the consideration of more legalistic questions, such as the text and structure of
the constitution. While the jurors were deemed competent to perform the latter in other con-
texts, judges shied from allowing jury review precisely because constitutional interpretation
involved more abstract considerations.
Nullification scholars today ask that jurors only consider personal notions of justice and
morality in rendering verdicts, not grounded by any legal standards-constitutional or other. See
supra notes 5-6, 12-18, and accompanying text. For the same reasons even 19th century advo-
cates of the law-finding right shied from jury review, such jurists would have rejected the
proposition that juries should render verdicts based solely on general norms of justice.
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eral verdict cases. Finally, from the outset, this strict limitation to
general verdicts greatly diluted the conceptual importance of the right
to decide the law. Over time, in fact, this conditioning of the law-
finding right would spell its own demise, for the original weak
framework was only a small step removed from the holdings of Bat-
tiste, Sparf & Hansen, and modem cases that the right to render a
general verdict necessarily implies a power to decide law, even if
there is no jury right to decide law.
From Zenger's Hamilton, through Wilson and Adams, through
the federal court decisions of the 19th century, the historical evidence
demonstrates that the jury's right to decide the law was consistently
cabined within its right to render general verdicts. Hamilton's con-
ception was clear: the law-finding right applied "where matter of law
is complicated with matter of fact."2 17 Wilson also made clear that the
right to decide law applied in those cases where "the question of law
is intimately and inseparably blended with the question of fact"--in a
general verdict.218 When there was no such blending, "there is no
doubt or difficulty in saying, by whom the separate decision shall be
made": questions of law "belong exclusively to the judges" and those
of fact "exclusively to the jury., 219 Adams, too, cast the right to de-
cide the law not on its own terms, but as part of the right to grant gen-
eral verdicts. "[T]he jury have a power of deciding an issue upon a
general verdict," he stated, and a general verdict "assuredly deter-
mines both the fact and the law."220 Thus, if the jury have the right to
cast a general verdict, he asked, "is it not an absurdity to suppose that
the law would oblige them to find a verdict according to the direction
of the court[?]" 221
Cases from the dawn of the new nation echoed the limitation that
juries enjoyed the right to decide law only when a general verdict
called "questions of law [to come] into joint consideration with the
facts. 222 Although judges often recited this statement merely in
passing, usually in cases where general verdicts allowed for jury law-
finding, some judges explored the implication of this condition for the
jury's law-finding right. As they did so, they recognized the strict
limits that this condition placed on the law-finding right: it diluted the
strength of the right itself by showing that it was not absolute; it re-
moved the opportunity for law-finding in numerous cases; it ce-
217 ALEXANDER, supra note 85, at 91.
218 WILSON, supra note 109, at 540.
219 See id
220 ADAMS, supra note 116, at 254.
221 Id.
222 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
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mented judges' position as the privileged interpreters of laws; and,
perhaps most importantly, it provided the distinction between the
right to decide the law and the power to decide against the law that
would ultimately spell the demise of the law-finding right itself.
In Stettinius v. United States,223 Judge Cranch explored these
limitations in considerable detail. The general verdict requirement
shows that the jury's right to decide the law is not absolute or exclu-
sive, Cranch explained. "It is admitted by all who have advocated the
right of the jury to decide the law in criminal cases, that that right ex-
tends only to the finding of a general verdict upon the general is-
sue."224 On the other hand:
[w]henever... the law was separated from the fact, so that
each could be seen and considered by itself, no pretense that
the jury had a right to decide the pure unmixed question of
law, has ever been set up by the wildest advocate of the rights
of juries.22
Observing this dichotomy, Cranch concluded that while the "immedi-
ate and direct right" to decide the law is "intrusted to the judges," that
right is only "incidental" to a jury.226 From this conclusion, the judge
made several additional observations limiting the jury's law-finding
right. First, he noted that judges were to decide every question of law
when "the law and the facts are separated," such as when parties liti-
gating agree on the facts or when special verdicts are given, and that
"[ilt has. never been pretended that the jury are to decide a pure ques-
tion of law unmingled with the facts. 227 Second, because the right is
directly that of the judge, "the jury ought to show the most respectful
deference to the advice and recommendation of judges, [and] the ex-
amples of their resisting the advice of a judge, in points of law,
[should be] rare. '228 Third, for the same reason, the "judge [has] a
right... to instruct the jury upon the whole law of the case. 2 29 And
most importantly, Judge Cranch concluded that the general verdict
requirement did not suggest that juries "ha[d] a right to render a ver-
dict against law., 230 Rather, it was simply the fact that a court could
not overturn a general verdict acquitting a defendant that granted ju-
ries the power to decide against the law in favor of a defendant. That
22 F. Cas. 1322 (C.C.D. D.C. 1839).
224 Id. at 1327.
226 Id. at 1329.
227 Id. at 1330.
m6 Id. at 1329.
29 Id. at 1335.
2'0 Id. at 1331.
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a court can set aside convictions against the law showed that a verdict
against the law was only within the power that accompanied its right
to issue general verdicts. The right to decide the law was thus not an
independent right, but a necessary concomitant of the right to issue
general verdicts.
231
As Judge Cranch's opinion foretold, the implications of the con-
ditioning of the right to decide law on the general verdict would
quickly evolve into the dilution, and ultimate abandonment, of the
right. The decline can be seen in a series of cases. In United States. v.
Fenwic 2 32 the court instructed that "the jury has right to give a gen-
eral verdict, and, in doing so, must, of necessity, decide upon the law
as well as upon the facts of the case., 233 Similarly, in United States v.
Stockwell, the court stated that "the right of the jury to decide the law,
was only the right to find a general verdict which includes both the
law and the facts of the case.'234 The famous cases of United States.
v. Battiste235 and United States v. Morris236 would tighten the logical
noose on this argument, leading the way to Sparf itself. In Battiste, a
prosecution for illegal slave trading, Justice Story remarked in detail
on the jury's law-finding capacity. In rendering a general verdict,
Story explained, jurors must "necessarily compound[] [both] law and
... fact... [and] must necessarily determine the law, as well as the
fact., 237 In undertaking this task, he proclaimed, although "they have
the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the
court[,] ... I deny, that.... they have the moral right to decide the
law according to their own notions, or pleasure. 238 Juries should in-
stead "follow the law; as it is laid down by the court., 239 Sixteen years
later in Morris, Justice Curtis expanded on this argument in far bolder
terms. In response to the defendant's argument about the jury's right
to decide the law, he stated that "[t]he jury have the power to go con-
trary to the law as decided by the court; but that the power is not the
right, is plain, when we consider that they have also the like power to
go contrary to the evidence, which they are sworn not to do."24° He
proceeded to reject the jurors' right to decide law in both the present
and past, concluding that in rendering a general verdict, jurors' "duty
and oath require them to apply to the facts, as they may find them, the
23' See id
232 25 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C.D. D.C. Cir. 1836) (No. 15,086).
2 Id. at 1064.
234 27 F. Cas. 1347, 1348 (C.C.D. D.C. Cir. 1836) (No. 16,405).
215 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
236 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
237 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1335.
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law given to them by the court."241 These latter opinions proved to be
models for the Supreme Court's decision forty years later in Sparf,
where the Court cited them extensively in concluding that although
the jury "have the physical power to disregard the law," they do not
have the "right to decide the law according to their own notions or
pleasure."
242
In sum, the unyielding insistence that the right to decide the law
was contingent on a general verdict proved a fatal weakness to the
right itself. Once again, it also conclusively demonstrates that the
right emerged from concerns over the jury's trial-specific role, and
not more dramatic notions of jurors as legislators. Perhaps most tell-
ing is that jurors, while allowed to render decisions in mixed fact/law
questions, were not permitted to rule on questions of pure law--ex-
actly the type of questions a nullification right would entrust them to
address.
III. THE RIGHTS COMPARED
This host of limitations on the law-finding right illustrates the er-
rors in the modem-day nullification account. To briefly re-examine
the nullification account's alternative assumptions about the relation-
ship between the right to nullify and the right to decide the law, there
first exists the standard assumption that the two rights are inter-
changeable. 243 Second, there is the Abramson-Scheflin view that
"[]urors' right to decide questions of law gives them considerably
greater authority than jury nullification itself requires," 244 and that
"historically, jury nullification was debated as one example of the
broader claim that jurors decided questions of law., 245 Figures A and
B, summarizing the discussion above, show that neither of these po-
sitions is tenable, historically or logically.
First, the least broad expanse of jury's rights is displayed in
the second concentric circle of Figure 1 in Appendix A: the jury's
right to decide the facts with impunity, established in Bushell's
Case. This right necessarily granted the jury the power to nullify
laws, an action countless juries have exercised since.2 6
Second, the right to decide the law, enjoyed by juries from Zen-
ger until Sparf, comprised a broader right than the pure fact-finding
24' Id. at 1336.
242 156 U.S. 151, 174 (citing United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835)
(No. 14,545)).
24-3 See supra notes 12-14, 44-50, and accompanying text.
244 ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 67 (emphasis added).
241 a at 68.
2 See infra, Appendix A.
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right. But given that the law-finding right could only be practiced in
general verdict cases where law and fact intermingled, the two rights
are closely related, and both are indeed ultimately anchored in the
fact-determining right. Even more important for the purpose of this
Article's argument is what lay beyond the scope of the law-finding
right-that is, what rights and duties the early Americans were not
comfortable granting to the jury even as they granted the right to de-
cide the law. As described above, the right did not give juries license
to undertake law-finding based on their own, extra-legal notions of
justice, but called instead on their knowledge and understanding of
the law, supplemented by arguments on the law by judges and liti-
gants. Nor did it permit them to decide knowingly against the law,
based on either their general notions of justice or their interpretation
of constitutional principles. Although, like the fact-finding right, the
law-finding right inherently granted to juries the power to nullify, this
power should not obscure the more narrow confines of their right to
decide law.
Finally, today's proposal that juries enjoy the right to decide
against the law based on their extra-legal notions of justice falls be-
yond even the "jury review" right denied to juries under the law-
finding right. Indeed, it combines the very elements that were found
to be beyond the law-finding right: deciding against the law, and de-
ciding based on extra-legal criteria. The nullification right is broader
than even the right to jury review because jury review would have
been based on mixed considerations of legal constitutional questions
(with which jurors were believed to be familiar) and more abstract
questions of justice (which they were not deemed competent to con-
sider). Nullification as it is defined today, on the other hand, would
eliminate even the legal considerations of constitutional analysis. As
Professor Simson explains, while the law-finding right approximated
the role of a judge (but with more limits) the proposed nullification
right is akin to that of a legislature, creating a separate body that "de-
fines blameworthy conduct according to its own notions of justice. 247
This analysis is unaffected by nullification scholars' attempts to
minimize the scope of their proposed right.248 As Figure 2 in Appen-
dix B shows,249 however they are characterized, the central duties
Scheflin, Abramson and others wish the jury to perform under a nulli-
fication right are precisely those that were beyond the scope of jury
247 Simson, supra note 37, at 507.
248 See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 14, at 111-15 (arguing that nullification may only
be practiced to acquit rather than convict-a showing of "jury mercy"-and that it does not
allow for the nullification of statutes or precedent).
249 See infra Appendix B.
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law-finding. The superficial similarity between the two rights is
largely due to the fact that both allow the jury to decide a case against
a judge's instruction, and that both provide the jury with the power to
nullify.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article's argument about the limited, trial-centered nature
of the right to decide the law is complemented by other scholars'
work detailing the reasons that the right emerged in colonial times
and continued through a century of United States law. Primarily, the
right's rise and fall reflected evolving confidence in the judicial
branch of the government as it grappled with and applied laws after
they were enacted. The distrust ° and lack of skill25 1 of colonial and
early American judges were crucial factors, along with a distrust of
lawyers in general. 2  A belief that law was sufficiently uncompli-
cated so that the average citizen, with the help of a judge, could make
competent legal decisions was another factor.2 3 The simplicity of the
criminal law further enabled people to entrust its interpretation to ju-
rors.2 4 Simply stated, rather than pitting the jury as a quasi-legislative
check against Congress, the rise of the right to decide the law is best
seen as a past battle between jury and judge, with the jury having en-
joyed some (but not even all) of the duties that judges enjoy today.
2" See Scott, supra note 1, at 416 ("The roots of [the law-finding] tradition undoubtedly
rested in the pre-revolutionary manipulation of the legal system by the royal judiciary.");
SIMSON, supra note 37, at 503 ("Appointed by the king and dependent upon his favor for their
continuation in office, ... colonial judges threatened to stretch the law at every opportunity in
favor of prosecutors proceeding in the name of the crown.").
251 See HOWVE, supra note 51, at 591 ("[A] large percentage of the judges were laymen.");
Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth
Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 518 (1996) (stating that after the Revolution,
"[t]he quality of the judiciary was low," and because of low salaries and the requirement of
circuit-riding, "the bench tended to be recruited from the less able members of the profession, if
indeed they were professionals at all"). Professor Nelson describes in detail the problems of
insufficiently skilled judges struggling to instruct colonial juries on the law-they often shied
from drawing legal conclusions, and in cases where more than one judge sat upon the bench (the
vast majority of trials), judges often gave conflicting instructions. See William E. Nelson, The
Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L.
REv. 893, 909-13 (1978).
25 See Lettow, supra note 251, at 518 (explaining that in the beginning of the Republic,
"[p]ublic hostility toward lawyers flourished" for both ideological and economic reasons); Note,
supra note 213, at 172 ("Underlying the conception of the jury as a bulwark against the unjust
use of government power [was] the distrust of 'legal experts."'). There was also a more general
distrust of "legal experts." See id.
23 See supra notes 108-115, 116-118, and accompanying text (describing Wilson's and
Adams' view of the accessibility of U.S. laws); Note, supra note 213, at 172 (describing the
"faith in the ability of the common people").
2 See ABRAMSON, supra note I, at 915 (stating that the paucity and simplicity of positive
law made the system less concerned with who was to interpret the law).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the decline in the right to decide the
law over the course of the 19th century came in response to funda-
mental changes in the American assessment of the judicial branch.
Judges and the bar in general became more skillede 5 and thus more
confident in constraining the jury's role. The fear of "imperial judges"
at the dawn of the law-finding right waned. 6 Substantive law grew
in sophistication and complexity, further removed from the under-
standing of the lay juror 7 Juries became less cozy and more hetero-
geneous, and they were less frequently populated with people who
inspired communal confidence.258 Overall, the demise of the right to
decide law was one of numerous tremors in the American legal sys-
tem generated by this growing confidence in the nation's judges. 5 9
This Article has thus shown that today's pro-nullification schol-
ars have misunderstood the practice of yesteryear. Law-finding was
not the equivalent of today's proposed right to nullify, and it certainly
was not more broad than that right. Even the radical English inventors
of jury law-finding conceived a jury working hard to interpret, con-
strue, and follow the law, whether it was the common law, or a given
statute, or possibly higher law. Colonial America adopted this con-
ception of juries as legal adjudicators, applying legal reasoning and
engaging in good-faith interpretation of law as a judge would. When
the new nation came into being, it too adopted this model; once again,
the jury's was a legal task, construing and following the law. Moreo-
ver, the new nation erected additional limitations on the law-finding
255 See Lettow, supra note 251, at 518-20 (discussing the improved education and training
of lawyers and judges over the course of the 19th century).
256 See Farley, supra note 51, at 203 (stating that "[tihe fear of judges had passed" by the
mid-19th century).
27 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 83, at 915-16 (describing that "[als the volume of
accessible positive law increased [in the 19th century,] it was evident that 'judge law' and 'jury
law' were distinct," while previously they had been the same); Lettow, supra note 251, at 521
("Newly confident and professionally-trained judges had a trial and appellate system that al-
lowed them to define the law clearly and to know when juries were disregarding it.").
253 See ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 89; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 83, at 916 ("Over
the course of the nineteenth century, as American society grew more diverse and jury member-
ship more inclusive-and as the legal issue presented to the courts grew more complicated-the
belief that jurors' consciences would yield sound, shared, consistent answers to legal questions
undoubtedly faded.").
259 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 83, at 917-21 (interpreting the deeper symbolism in
the jury's loss of power to decide the law); Farley, supra note 51 (describing the emergence of
more formal jury instructions effected by the new judge-jury balance, and the consequent bol-
stering of appellate courts' power and scope of review of trials); Lettow, supra note 251 (tracing
judges' growing use of "new trial" to control juries); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial
Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L REv. 1031, 1034-35 (1997) ("Judicial review
could only become possible after influential segments of the American political community
moved away from the belief that juries were competent triers of law and fact alike, and instead




right which further cabined the jury's role. These limitations would
ultimately lead to the internal collapse of the right itself into today's
practical acceptance of juries' power to nullify.
If modem-day nullification proponents wish to claim for today's
jury the more esteemed role in our democratic process that would
come with the right to nullify, which would require our legal system
to include instructions to jurors of that right as well as the right of
self-proclaimed nullifiers to remain on juries,260 they will have to cre-
ate it from whole cloth. For although there is ample precedent demon-
strating the jury's power to nullify, the annals of America's past sim-
ply do not provide precedent for the jury's right to do so.
260 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F. 3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a juror intend-
ing to nullify the law, without examining the evidence, may be dismissed).
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Figure 1.
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